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Abstract   
This  thesis  extends  the  research  of  Duarte,  Longstaff  and  Yu  (2007)  by  looking  at  the  risk  and                                   
return  characteristics  of  yield  curve  arbitrage.  Like  in  Duarte  et  al.,  return  indexes  are  created                               
by  implementing  a  particular  version  of  the  strategy  on  historical  data.  We  extend  the  analysis                               
to  include  both  USD  and  EUR  swap  markets.  The  sample  period  is  from  2006-2020,  which  is                                 
more  recent  than  in  Duarte  et  al.  (1988-2004).  While  the  USD  strategy  produces  risk-adjusted                             
excess  returns  of  over  five  percent  per  year,  the  EUR  strategy  underperforms,  which  we  argue                               
is  a  result  of  the  term  structure  model  not  being  well  suited  to  describe  the  abnormal  shape  of                                     
the  EUR  swap  curve  that  manifests  over  much  of  the  sample  period.  For  both  USD  and  EUR,                                   
performance  is  much  better  over  the  first  half  of  the  sample  (2006-2012)  than  over  the  second                                 
half  (2013-2020),  which  coincides  with  a  fall  in  swap  rate  volatility.  Still,  risk  factor  exposure                               
is  low  for  both  strategies,  though  it  is  higher  for  USD  than  for  EUR.  We  conclude  that  there  is                                       
potential  for  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  in  yield  curve  arbitrage,  but  that  the  strategy  suffers                             
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1  Introduction   
Alfred  Winslow  Jones  coined  the  term  “hedged  fund”  and  created  the  first  hedge  fund                             
structure  in  1949  (Mallaby,  2010).  From  then  on,  the  popularity  of  hedge  funds  has  exploded,                               
and  their  total  assets  under  management  has  grown  from  a  few  million  to  over  $3.3  trillion  by                                   
2020  (Barclays  Hedge,  2020).  Naturally,  as  hedge  funds’  assets  under  management  grew,  new                           
families  of  investment  strategies  emerged;  one  of  these  was  fixed-income  arbitrage,  which  is                           
the  main  subject  of  our  paper.  Fixed  income  arbitrage  strategies  try  to  profit  from  mispricings                               
in  fixed  income  markets,  and  are  often  associated  with  the  demise  of  hedge  fund  LTCM  in  the                                   
late-1990.  In  spite  of  LTCM’s  failure,  fixed  income  arbitrage  remains  popular  to  this  day  with                               
more  than  $750  billion  of  capital  invested  in  fixed  income  arbitrage  hedge  funds  at  the  end  of                                  
2020  (Barclays  Hedge,  2020).   
As  detailed  by  Lowenstein  (2001),  LTCM  quadrupled  investors’  money  over  a  period                         
of  four  years  (1994  to  1998)  by,  at  least  mainly,  engaging  in  fixed  income  arbitrage  strategies.                                 
The  fund’s  returns  were  accompanied  by  low  levels  of  volatility,  resulting  in  a  Sharpe  ratio  of                                 
4.35  (net  of  fees)  before  its  demise.  However,  with  a  leverage  ratio  of  25,  the  fund  eventually                                   
lost  all  its  capital  following  the  1998  Russian  debt  default  and  the  ensuing  market  turbulence,                               
when  virtually  all  their  trades  failed.  Supposed  “risk-free”  arbitrage  strategies  turned  out  to  be                             
less  “risk-free”  than  theorized.   
In  retrospect,  LTCM’s  failure  demonstrated  how  fixed  income  arbitrage  strategies  that                       
were  supposed  to  carry  little  risk  could  lead  to  painful  losses  (Lowenstein,  2001).  The  natural                              
question  to  ask,  then,  is  whether  fixed  income  arbitrage  is  truly  arbitrage,  or  if  the  return  from                                   
these  strategies  is  primarily  a  reward  for  being  exposed  to  systematic  risk  factors.  In  a  widely                                 
read  paper,  Duarte,  Longstaff  and  Yu  (2007)  find  that  while  some  of  the  strategies  are  indeed                                 
arbitrage-like,  other  strategies  have  significant  risk  factor  exposure,  particularly  the  ones  that                         
require  little  skill  to  implement.  They  suggest  that  strategies  requiring  “intellectual  capital”  to                           
implement  may  generate  positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  returns;  still,  even  for  these  strategies,                         
returns  are  far  from  “risk-free”.  Still,  their  results,  as  they  argue,  indicate  that  there  is  more  to                                   
fixed  income  arbitrage  than  “picking  up  nickels  in  front  of  a  steamroller”,  i.e.  earning  a  small,                                 
positive  return  most  of  the  time  only  to  suffer  large  losses  in  times  of  market  stress  (like  when                                     
selling  uncovered  index  puts).   
In  this  thesis  we  look  at  one  of  the  fixed  income  arbitrage  strategies  from  Duarte  et  al.                                   
in  greater  detail,  namely  yield  curve  arbitrage.  Following  their  methodology,  we  create  return                           
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indexes  for  the  2006-2020  period  by  implementing  the  strategy  on  historical  data  of  USD  and                               
EUR  par  swap  rates.  Our  implementation  relies  on  an  affine  three-factor  term  structure  model                             
to  both  identify  and  hedge  “cheap”  and  “rich”  maturities  on  the  yield  curve.  The  strategies  are                                 
implemented  on  daily  data,  and  every  practical  detail  of  the  USD  and  EUR  swap  markets  are                                 
taken  into  account  in  order  to  obtain  realistic  return  series.  In  addition  to  looking  beyond  U.S.                                 
markets,  our  thesis  extends  the  research  of  Duarte  et  al.  by  looking  at  the  strategy  over  a  new                                     
sample  period,  which,  among  other  events,  includes  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009  and  the                             
unorthodox  monetary  policy  response  that  followed;  we  hypothesize  that  the  ensuing  effects,                         
like  increased  central  bank  control  over  the  yield  curve  and  lower  interest  rate  volatility,  may                               
have  impacted  its  profitability.   
Over  the  2006-2020  sample,  with  the  initial  amount  of  capital  set  so  that  the  strategies                               
produce  a  return  volatility  of  12%  per  year,  the  USD  strategy  produces  an  excess  return  of  ca.                                   
5.5%  per  year,  implying  a  Sharpe  ratio  of  0.462.  The  excess  return  of  the  EUR  strategy  is  not                                     
statistically  different  from  zero,  which  we  argue  is  a  result  of  the  three-factor  model  not  being                                 
well  suited  to  describe  the  peculiar  shape  of  the  EUR  swap  curve  that  manifests  over  much  of                                   
the  sample  period.  For  both  USD  and  EUR,  performance  is  markedly  better  over  the  first  half                                 
of  the  sample  (2006-2012)  than  over  the  later  half  (2013-2020),  which  coincides  with  a  fall  in                                 
par  rates  volatility.  This  suggests  that  the  returns  to  the  strategy  are  positively  correlated  with                               
the  level  of  interest  rate  volatility,  which  is  opposite  to  that  of  other  arbitrage  strategies  where                                 
volatility  is  usually  unwanted.   
Seemingly,  adjusting  for  exposure  to  risk  factors  does  not  materially  lower  the  excess                           
returns  of  the  yield  curve  strategies.  The  USD  strategy  produces  a  risk-adjusted  excess  return                             
of  over  five  percent  per  year,  which  is  significant  at  the  10%  level;  for  EUR,  the  risk-adjusted                                   
excess  return  is  zero.  The  R²  is  roughly  10%  for  EUR  and  roughly  22%  for  USD,  the  latter  of                                       
which  being  higher  due  to  negative  correlation  with  the  stock  market  and  positive  correlation                             
with  U.S.  Treasuries.  The  included  risk  factors  control  for  both  equity,  credit,  interest  rate  and                               
volatility  risk  factor  exposure.   
The  findings  in  this  thesis  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  results  of  Duarte  et  al.,  who                                 
report  that  yield  curve  arbitrage  produces  positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  with  a  limited                           
degree  of  risk  factor  exposure.  That  being  said,  our  results  from  EUR  swap  markets  illustrate                               
that  the  strategy  is  exposed  to  model  risk  and  to  the  risk  of  structural  changes  in  the  shape  and                                       
volatility  of  the  term  structure.  We  believe  that  this  is  an  important  finding,  and  view  it  as  the                                     
key  contribution  of  this  thesis.  In  addition,  we  believe  our  implementation  of  the  strategy  can                               
serve  as  inspiration  for  others.   
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The  rest  of  this  thesis  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  key  papers  related  to                                 
the  risk  and  return  characteristics  of  arbitrage.  Section  3  introduces  the  necessary  theory,  with                             
a  focus  on  swap  and  term  structure  modeling.  Section  4  introduces  the  concept  of  yield  curve                                 
arbitrage  and  Section  5  looks  at  our  implementation  of  the  strategy.  Section  6  presents  results.                               
Finally,  Section  7  concludes.   
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2  Literature  Review   
2.1  Arbitrage  in  the  Literature   
Arbitrage  is  an  age-old  concept,  but  it  was  not  until  the  emergence  of  arbitrage  pricing                               
in  the  early  1970s  that  academics  began  studying  the  risk  and  return  of  arbitrage  strategies.  In                                 
an  academic  context,  arbitrage  refers  to  a  trading  strategy  that  is  costless  at  inception  but  that                                 
guarantees  a  strictly  positive  return  –  a  “free  lunch”,  so  to  speak.  This  is  done  by  exploiting  a                                     
relative  mispricing  between  a  security  and  its  replicating  portfolio;  if  the  cheap  one  is  bought                               
and  the  expensive  one  is  sold,  an  arbitrageur  can  pocket  the  difference  and  have  no  remaining                                 
obligations  since  the  cash  flows,  by  construction,  net  out  to  zero.  In  reality,  the  arbitrage  term                                 
is  used  in  a  wider  sense  to  describe  trading  strategies  that  exploit  mispricings  between  similar                               
securities.  As  a  result,  arbitrage  strategies  do  not  typically  lead  to  risk-free  profits.   
In  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997),  the  authors  define  a  more  realistic  view  of  arbitrage  by                               
looking  into  professional  arbitrage  and  its  implications  for  security  pricing.  From  a  traditional                           
point  of  view,  an  arbitrageur  obtains  a  risk-free  profit  by  exploiting  mispricings  between  two                             
similar  portfolios  and  the  subsequent  correction  to  fair  value,  and  the  strategy  is  theoretically                             
supposed  to  carry  no  risk  and  to  require  no  capital.  However,  Shleifer  et  al.  argue  that  interim                                   
losses  on  such  strategies  can  force  arbitrageurs  to  liquidate  their  positions  at  a  loss  in  order  to                                   
preserve  their  capital.  This  implies  that  arbitrage  strategies  carry  risk  and  require  capital,  and                             
that  arbitrage  opportunities  may  persist  if  traders  are  unwilling  to  take  on  the  risk.   
Like  Shleifer  et  al.,  Pontiff  (2005)  argues  that  arbitrage  is  indeed  risky.  Pontiff  focuses                             
on  the  idiosyncratic  risk  of  arbitrage  strategies,  and  makes  the  case  that  the  idiosyncratic  risk                              
of  such  strategies  are  unhedgeable.  As  a  result,  arbitrageurs  must  trade  off  the  expected  profit                               
from  an  arbitrage  trade  and  the  idiosyncratic  risk  to  which  the  trade  exposes  them.   
Likewise,  Patton  (2009)  –  in  which  the  author  looks  at  “market  neutral”  hedge  funds  –                               
finds  evidence  that  “market  neutral”  strategies  are  indeed  often  exposed  to  some  risk  factors.                             
Patton  points  out  that  such  strategies  –  including  arbitrage  –  are  often  associated  with  making                               
trades  that  are  neutral  with  respect  to  some  key  market  variable,  like  the  general  level  of  rates                                   
or  the  returns  on  some  stock  index.  Yet,  exposure  to  residual  variables  still  remain.   
Mitchell  and  Pulvino  (2012)  investigate  a  specific  example  of  the  scenario  outlined  in                           
Shleifer  et  al.,  namely  when  debt  financing  was  pulled  from  arbitrage  hedge  funds  during  the                               
financial  crisis.  Instead  of  forcing  prices  of  similar  securities  to  converge,  arbitrageurs  had  to                             
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liquidate  existing  positions,  thereby  causing  the  level  of  mispricing  to  increase;  this  naturally                           
induced  losses.  Their  findings  illustrate  that,  since  arbitrage  strategies  often  require  leverage,                         
traders  run  the  risk  of  having  to  liquidate  their  positions  if  debt  financing  is  pulled.   
Moving  on  to  particular  strategies,  Gatev,  Goetzmann  and  Rouwenhorst  (1999)  study                       
pairs  trading  over  the  1962  to  1997  period.  A  form  of  statistical  arbitrage,  pairs  trading  entails                                 
forming  pairs  of  stocks  that  tend  to  move  together;  when  the  spread  between  the  two  widens,                                 
one  buys  the  “loser”  and  shorts  the  winner.  If  history  repeats  itself,  prices  will  narrow  and  the                                   
arbitrageur  will  make  money.  Their  results  suggest  that  pairs  trading  produces  positive  excess                           
returns  with  a  low  degree  of  correlation  to  the  S&P  500;  nevertheless,  Gatev  et  al.  realize  that                                   
the  strategies  are  trading  intensive  and  that  the  profitability  of  the  strategies  depends  upon  the                               
cost  and  impact  of  execution.  The  authors  extended  their  sample  period  in  Gatev  et  al.  (2006),                                 
where  they  conclude  that  the  excess  return  is  reward  for  keeping  markets  efficient.   
Mitchell  and  Pulvino  (2001)  study  the  risk  and  return  characteristics  of  risk  arbitrage,                           
which  is  a  strategy  that  aims  to  profit  from  the  spread  between  a  target  company’s  stock  price                                   
and  the  offer  price.  In  their  paper,  Mitchell  and  Pulvino  analyze  4,750  mergers  (1963  to  1998)                                 
in  order  to  construct  a  return  index.  The  authors  find  that  the  returns  to  risk  arbitrage  are  very                                     
similar  to  those  obtained  from  writing  uncovered  index  put  options  and  that,  adjusted  for  risk,                               
the  excess  return  is  ca.  4%  per  year.  They  postulate  that  this  excess  return  represents  a  reward                                   
paid  to  risk  arbitrageurs  for  providing  liquidity,  particularly  during  market  crashes.   
Next,  Argarwal,  Fung,  Loon  and  Naik  (2011)  study  the  risk  and  return  characteristics                           
of  convertible  bond  arbitrage.  Most  commonly,  the  strategy  involves  taking  a  long  position  in                             
a  convertible  bond  while  delta-hedging  the  equity  risk;  the  rationale  of  the  strategy  is  that  the                                 
convertible  bond  is  sometimes  priced  ineffciently  relative  to  the  issuer’s  stock  (the  embedded                           
equity  option  is  often  cheap).  Their  results  suggest  that  convertible  arbitrageurs  are  rewarded                           
for  playing  an  intermediation  role  of  funding  issuers  while  transferring  part  of  the  equity  risk                               
of  the  convertibles  to  the  equity  market  through  their  hedging  of  the  equity  option.   
Seemingly,  most  studies  of  arbitrage  strategies  seem  to  conclude  that  arbitrage  is  risky                           
and  that  arbitrageurs  are  rewarded  for  providing  some  kind  of  service,  be  it  intermediation  or                               
liquidity  provision.  Most  studies  also  document  negatively  skewed  return  distributions;  while                       
these  trading  strategies  tend  to  make  money  on  average,  they  occasionally  suffer  large  losses,                             
like  option  selling.  Such  losses  can  be  a  result  of  the  nature  of  the  strategy,  but  it  may  also  be                                         
a  result  of  having  to  liquidate  positions  at  a  loss  if  debt  financing  dries  up  or  if  interim  losses                                       
result  in  margin  calls  that  the  arbitrageur  cannot  meet  without  selling  his  holdings.   
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2.2  Duarte,  Longstaff,  and  Yu   
Duarte,  Longstaff  and  Yu  (2007)  is  arguably  the  most  in-depth  study  of  risk  and  return                               
in  arbitrage  to  date.  In  their  paper,  Duarte  et  al.  construct  hypothetical  return  indexes  for  five                                 
popular  fixed  income  arbitrage  strategies  over  the  1988  to  2004  period,  and  examine  both  the                               
return  and  risk  factor  exposure  of  the  strategies. 1  Since  our  paper  is  largely  inspired  by  theirs,                                 
we  have  devoted  a  full  subsection  to  discussing  the  paper’s  most  salient  results.   
Duarte  et  al.  first  consider  swap  spread  arbitrage.  In  its  essence,  swap  spread  arbitrage                             
involves  receiving  fixed  in  an  interest  rate  swap  (receiving  S )  while  shorting  a  Treasury  bond                               
of  the  same  maturity  as  the  swap  through  repo  (thus  paying  T ).  The  swap  finances  at  LIBOR,                                   
while  the  short  position  earns  the  repo  rate  r ;  therefore,  if  S  -  T  is  greater  than  LIBOR  -  r  over                                           
the  life  of  the  trade,  the  arbitrageur  should  make  money.  Historically,  that  has  often  been  true,                                
but  the  trade  is  quite  risky;  if  LIBOR  rates  increase  relative  to  risk-free  rates  after  initiation  of                                   
the  trade,  the  strategy  fails.  Duarte  et  al.  find  that  the  excess  return  to  swap  spread  arbitrage  is                                     
roughly  5%  per  year  over  the  sample;  the  risk-adjusted  excess  return,  however,  is  zero,  as  the                                 
strategy  has  significant  exposure  to  specific  risk  factors.  The  authors  thus  conclude  that  there                             
is  very  little  “arbitrage”  in  swap  spread  arbitrage,  and  that  the  positive  excess  return  simply  is                                 
a  reward  for  being  exposed  to  financial  sector  events  (by  paying  LIBOR  rates).   
Duarte  et  al.  thereafter  look  at  yield  curve  arbitrage,  which,  of  course,  is  the  subject  of                                 
our  thesis.  Yield  curve  arbitrage  is  more  involved  than  swap  spread  arbitrage,  and  the  strategy                               
is  presented  in  detail  in  Sections  4  and  5.  In  brief,  the  strategy  involves  identifying  cheap/rich                                 
points  along  the  term  structure  with  the  help  of  term  structure  models.  Like  in  our  thesis,  they                                   
implement  the  strategy  by  trading  swaps.  Duarte  et  al.  find  that  yield  curve  arbitrage  produces                               
risk-adjusted  excess  returns  of  ca.  4%  per  year  with  a  low  degree  of  exposure  to  risk  factors  –                                     
in  their  view,  the  positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  return  is  a  result  of  the  strategy  requiring  skill                                 
to  implement,  and  is  not  simply  reward  for  being  exposed  to  some  type  of  risk.   
Later  in  their  paper,  Duarte  et  al.  also  look  at  credit,  mortgage,  and  volatility  arbitrage,                               
the  details  of  which  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  In  any  case,  both  credit  and  mortgage                                     
arbitrage  generate  positive  alphas,  which  is  not  the  case  for  volatility  arbitrage.   
The  authors  argue  that  the  strategies  with  positive  risk-adjusted  excess  return  succeed                         
because  they  demand  “intellectual  capital”;  for  instance,  yield  curve  arbitrage  requires  traders                         
to  calibrate  a  multi-factor  term  structure  model,  which  is  not  a  trivial  exercise.  In  contrast,  the                                 
1  As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  Duarte  et  al.  only  look  at  U.S.  markets.   
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more  trivial  strategies,  like  swap  spread  arbitrage,  require  less  skill;  in  equilibrium,  therefore,                           
perfect  competition  will  drive  down  their  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  to  zero.  That,  however,                           
will  not  be  the  case  for  the  strategies  requiring  “skill”,  where  arbitrageurs  can  rely  on  superior                                 
financial  know-how,  information,  or  modeling  to  outperform  their  competitors.   
We  shall  refer  to  Duarte  et  al.  as  “DLY”  for  the  remainder  of  this  thesis.   
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3  Theory   
3.1  Interest  Rate  Swaps   
3.1.1  Par  Swaps   
An  interest  rate  swap  (IRS)  is  a  derivative  contract  through  which  two  parties  agree  to                               
exchange  interest  payments  calculated  at  a  fixed  rate  for  interest  payments  calculated  at  a  rate                               
that  changes  over  time,  typically  at  a  short-term  rate  such  as  LIBOR.  Being  an  OTC  contract,                                 
interest  rate  swaps  may  be  customized  to  the  parties’  needs,  but  the  most  liquid  swaps  are  the                                   
so-called  par  swaps.  In  a  par  swap,  the  fixed  rate  is  set  so  that  the  contract  is  fair  at  initiation;                                         
in  other  words,  given  the  expected  evolution  of  the  floating  rate,  paying  a  fixed  rate   for                                   
 years  has  the  same  present  value  as  paying  the  floating  rate,  at  some  periodicity,  over  those                                   
 years  (for  example,  paying  3-month  USD-LIBOR  every  quarter).  Consequently,  par  swap                         
rate   may  be  interpreted  as  the  expected,  weighted-average  floating  rate  over  the  swap’s                             
term,  where  weights  are  given  by  the  discount  factors  to  the  floating  rates’  dates.   
Given  that  the  floating  rate  of  the  IRS  is  taken  to  be  the  risk-free  rate,  it  can  be  shown                                       
that  the  present  value  of  the  floating  leg  equals  par,  or  the  swap’s  notional  (see  Chapter  16  in                                     
Tuckman  et  al.  for  a  justification).  As  a  result,   is  chosen  so  that  the  present  value  of  the                                       
fixed  leg  also  equals  par.  If  the  fixed  leg  accrues  semiannually,  which  is  typically  the  case  for                                   




where   is  the  discount  factor  to  time   (here,  discount  factors  are  calculated  from  the                                 
projected  risk-free  rates).  If  the  fixed  leg  accrues  once  per  year,  which  is  typically  the  case  for                                   
EUR  swaps,   
  
(3.2) .   
  
Hence,  if  one  has  a  function  for  the  discount  factor  to  an  arbitrary  time,  one  also  has  a                                     
function  for  the  -year  par  swap  rate.  This  result  will  be  used  later  in  the  thesis.   
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3.1.2  Non-Par  Swaps   
If  an  investor  enters  into  a  10-year  swap  at  the  10-year  par  swap  rate,  the  contract  has,                                   
per  the  results  of  the  previous  subsection,  a  net  present  value  (NPV)  of  zero  at  initiation  –  the                                     
par  swap  rate  is  set  such  that  this  is  the  case.  However,  as  time  passes,  the  swap  contract  is  no                                         
longer  a  10-year  swap,  and  the  term  structure  of  par  swap  rates  has  likely  changed;  as  a  result                                     
the  swap  contract  will  have  a  nonzero  NPV.  For  instance,  the  right  to  receive  fixed  at  2.875%                                   
on  some  notional  for  10  years  will  be  valuable  if  the  10-year  par  swap  rate  declines  to  1.50%.                                     
The  exact  value  is  found  by  discounting  the  contractually  fixed  payments  at  a  discount  curve                               
constructed  from  the  current  term  structure  of  par  swap  rates  (how  such  a  curve  is  constructed                                 
is  explained  in  the  Appendix);  the  present  value  of  the  fixed  leg  is  then  compared  to  the  value                                     












where   is  the  notional  of  the  swap,   the  swap’s  fixed  leg  rate,   the  number  of  remaining                                       
fixed  leg  payments,   the  time  (years)  between  two  fixed  leg  payments  at   and                                  
(at  the  appropriate  day  count  convention),   the  discount  factor  to  time  ,   the  previous                                 
floating  rate  fixing,    the  time  to  the  next  floating  rate  fixing,  and    is  “today”.   
In  the  previous  subsection  it  was  argued  that  the  value  of  the  floating  leg  equals  par  at                                   
initiation;  this  is  also  the  case  at  each  reset  date.  However,  between  two  reset  dates,  the  value                                   
of  the  floating  leg  can  be  different  from  par;  now,  its  value  equals  par  plus  the  predetermined                                   
floating  rate  payment  for  the  next  payment  date.  Therefore  its  value  will  be  higher  than  par  if                                   
  is  higher  than  the  spot  rate  implied  by  the  discount  factor  to  ,  and  vice  versa.   
Note  that  the  formulas  in  (3.3)  assume  that  the  swap’s  notional  is  exchanged  when  the                               
swap  matures.  This  is  a  common  convention  when  calculating  the  NPV  of  swaps.   
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3.2  Term  Structure  Modeling   
3.2.1  PCA  of  the  Yield  Curve   
Earlier  studies  have  demonstrated  that  there  are  predominantly  three  factors  that  drive                         
movements  in  the  term  structure.  Litterman  and  Scheinkman  (1991)  estimate  common  factors                         
through  principal  component  analysis  (PCA)  of  spot  rates,  derived  from  U.S.  Treasury  yields,                           
over  the  1984-1988  period;  they  find  that  three  factors  explain  96%  of  the  variance  of  yields.                                 
Through  the  mechanics  of  PCA  (which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis)  these  “factors”  are                                 
constructed  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  independent  and  thereby  uncorrelated.  Litterman  et  al.                               
call  these  factors  level ,  steepness ,  and  curvature ;  the  level  factor  causes  a  parallel  shift  of  the                                 
spot  rate  curve,  while  the  steepness  factor  lowers  spot  rates  up  to  five  years  and  –  at  the  same                                       
time  –  raises  spot  rates  of  longer  maturities.  Finally,  the  curvature  factor  increases  the  overall                               
curvature  of  the  spot  rate  curve  up  to  20  years,  which  is  associated  with  interest  rate  volatility.                                   
Litterman  et  al.  also  find  that  the  first  factor,  the  level  factor,  is  by  far  the  most  important;  the                                       
level  factor  explains  89.5%  of  total  variance,  compared  to  8.5%  for  the  steepness  factor.   
Later  studies  have  confirmed  the  results  of  Litterman  et  al.  (see,  for  example,  Baygün,                             
Showers  and  Cherpelis  (2000)).  Instead  of  presenting  the  results  from  such  studies,  which  are                             
by  now  quite  old,  we  present  our  own  results  for  USD  and  EUR  par  swap  rates  over  the  2006                                       
to  2020  period.  Here,  PCA  is  applied  to  weekly  changes  in  par  swap  rates  for  maturities  from                                   
one  to  30  years.  Results  are  shown  in  Figure  3.1  and  3.2  below;  the  factor  loading  shows  how                                     
a  one-standard-deviation  change  in  the  factor  impacts  par  swap  rates  of  different  terms.  These                             
factors  are  quite  similar  to  the  ones  shown  in  Litterman  et  al.  and  similar  studies,  although  the                                   
shape  of  the  curvature  factor  is  somewhat  different.  The  fraction  of  total  variance  explained  –                               
which  is  listed  in  parentheses  –  is  also  quite  similar.  Quite  remarkably,  the  factors  are  close  to                                   
identical  for  USD  and  EUR  which,  to  some  extent,  illustrates  the  factors’  pervasiveness.   
Some  interpretation  of  these  three  factors  is  in  order.  The  level  factor  –  which  causes  a                                 
near  parallel  shift  –  is  driven  by  economic  news  that  are  long-lived  in  nature;  a  natural  way  to                                     
think  about  such  a  shift  is  that  long-run  inflation  expectations  or  the  long-run  real  interest  rate                                 
increases  which,  in  turn,  raises  swap  rates  across  the  curve.  In  contrast,  the  steepness  factor  –                                 
referred  to  as  slope  in  the  figures  –  is  driven  by  news  about  monetary  policy;  if,  for  example,                                     
the  Federal  Reserve  hints  at  lower  policy  rates  ahead,  short  term  swap  rates  will  fall  and  long                                   
term  swap  rates  will,  at  least  in  many  cases,  rise  as  investors  anticipate  higher  inflation  ahead                                 
on  the  back  of  low  policy  rates.  The  third  factor  is  associated  with  interest  rate  volatility.   
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Figure  3.1   
  




Figure  3.2   
  
This  figure  shows  the  first  three  principal  components  of  changes  in  EUR  swap  rates  over  the  2006-2020  period.   
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3.2.2  Short  Rate  Models   
In  its  essence,  a  short  rate  model  specifies  a  stochastic  process  for  the  short-term  rate,                               




where   is  a  standard  Wiener  process. 1  There  are  many  different  specifications  of                              
and   in  the  short  rate  literature,  and  one  popular  specification  will  be  introduced  in  the                                 
next  subsection.  In  some  cases,  these  drift  and  volatility  functions  are  time-dependent  so  as  to                               
allow  for  a  close  fit  to  both  the  term  structure  of  interest  rates  and  interest  rate  volatility;  still,                                     
in  other  cases,  the  functions  are  constants.  In  either  case,  the  short-term  rate   is  assumed  to                                   
evolve  from  its  starting  value   via   so  that  a  change  in  the  short-term  rate  is  given  by  the                                         
sum  of  a  non-random  drift  term  and  a  random  perturbation  proportional  to  .   
In  some  cases,  short  rate  models  are  used  to  price  interest  rate  options,  which  involves                               
numerical  techniques  such  as  binomial  trees  and  Monte  Carlo  simulation. 2  In  other  cases,  the                             
interest  is  not  so  much  on  the  short-term  rate  itself,  but  rather  on  the  term  structure  of  interest                                     




to  obtain  an  analytical  expression  for  the  discount  factor  to  time   (see  Brigo  and  Mercurio).                                 
Since  par  swap  rates  can  be  written  as  a  function  of  the  discount  factors  over  the  swap’s  term,                                     
one  may  also  obtain  an  analytical  expression  for  par  swap  rates.  The  model-implied  par  swap                               
rates  are  then  functions  of  the  short  rate  model’s  parameters  (and  time  ).  In  other  words,  in                                   
the  cases  where  (3.5)  has  a  solution,  a  user  can  specify  the  stochastic  process  for  ,  solve  for                                     
par  swap  rates,  and  compare  model-implied  swap  rates  to  swap  rates  observed  in  the  markets.                               
Of  course,  for  the  model  to  have  predictive  value,  the  process  for   has  to  be  meaningful  and                                     
sufficiently  complex  to  reflect  real-world  interest  rate  dynamics.  Taken  the  other  way  around,                           
a  user  may  also  start  with  a  set  of  market  swap  rates  and  parameterize  the  short  rate  model  so                                       
as  to  minimize  deviations  between  market-observed  and  model-implied  swap  rates.   
1  As  this  thesis  is  not  about  stochastic  calculus  we  will  refer  the  reader  to  Wiersema  (2008)  for  an  introduction  to                                           
Itô  calculus  and  Wiener  processes.   
2  Brigo  and  Mercurio  (2006)  is  a  comprehensive  reference  for  short  rate  models  in  the  context  of  options  pricing .   
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3.2.3  The  Vasicek  Model   
Short  rate  modeling  began  with  a  seminal  paper  by  Oldrich  Vasicek  (1977),  where  the                             
author  also  proposed  a  particular  specification  of  equation  (3.4)  which  has  come  to  be  known                               




where  both  ,  ,  and   are  constants.  The  model  is  a  so-called  mean-reverting  model:  when                                 
 is  different  from  ,   tends  toward   at  a  speed  determined  by  .  Hence   represents  the                                       
long-run  interest  rate  to  which   converges  from  its  initial  value.  These  dynamics  reflect  the                               
empirical  observation  that  interest  rates  tend  to  exhibit  mean-reversion,  which  is  quite  natural                           
when,  as  in  many  economies,  central  banks  have  an  inflation  target;  if,  for  example,  the  target                                 
is  2%  –  and  if  real  GDP  growth  is,  say,  2%  –  the  interest  rate  should  be  around  4%  over  time.                                           
Nonetheless,  the  expected  short-term  rate  can  only  move  monotonically  downward  or  upward                         
in  the  model,  which  means  that  it  will  not  be  able  to  describe  situations  in  which  investors  see                                     
lower  short-term  rates  in  the  near  term  but  eventually  higher  short-term  rates  in  the  long  term.                                 
As  a  consequence,  the  Vasicek  model  only  allows  for  simple  downward-  and  upward-sloping                           
term  structures;  an  “inverted”  yield  curve,  for  instance,  is  not  possible  in  this  model.   




where  the  integral  is  an  Itô  integral.   
To  solve  for  discount  factors,  one  substitutes  (3.7)  into  (3.5).  The  solution  –  expressed                             




where    is  the  -year  spot  rate. 3   
To  solve  for  model-implied  par  swap  rates,  one  uses  equation  3.8  iteratively.   
3  Discount  factors  may  then  be  obtained  via  the  relationship:  DF (T)  =  exp[- r (T)  x  T],  where  r (T)  is  the  spot  rate.   
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While  the  Vasicek  model  is  elegant  and  intuitive,  it  is  too  simplistic  for  many  real-life                               
applications.  Firstly,  the  model  has  only  one  factor,  namely  the  short-term  rate  ;  from  (3.8)                               
it  is  evident  that  the  initial  value  of  the  short-term  rate,  ,  is  the  only  variable  affecting  rates                                     
of  different  terms  (the  other  parameters  are  constants).  In  other  words,  the  only  way  spot  rates                                 
of  different  terms  can  change  is  through  a  change  in  ,  implying  that  the  interest  rate  risk  of                                     
30-year  bond  can  be  hedged  with  a  1-year  bond  (by  neutralizing  the  exposure  to  ).  Second,                                 
the  model  is  not  flexible  enough  to  fit  most  term  structures,  as  can  be  seen  from  Figure  3.3  –                                       
in  the  figure,  the  value  of   is  chosen  so  that  the  model-implied  10-year  swap  rate  equals  the                                     
market  rate.  The  model  is  clearly  not  flexible  enough  to  fit  this  particular  term  structure  shape                                 
when  the  constant  parameters  are  set  “reasonably”  (   =  4.0%,    =  0.10,    =  1.0%).   
  
Figure  3.3   
  
This  figure  shows  the  Vasicek  model  fitted  to  match  the  10-year  USD  swap  rate  on  03/12/2015.   
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3.2.4  Three-Factor  Model  with  Coupled  SDEs   
The  three-factor  model  from  Tuckman  and  Serrat  (2011)  is  described  by  the  following                           






where   is  a  standard  Wiener  process  and  .  In  (3.9),  short-term  rate                              
mean-reverts  to   at  a  speed  determined  by  ;  ,  on  the  other  hand,  mean-reverts  to                                    
at  a  speed  determined  by  ,  while   mean-reverts  to   (which  is  a  constant)  at  a  speed  set                                       
by .  However,  both   and   fluctuate  about  their  expected  paths  with  volatility   and                                 
,  respectively;   itself  has  no  random  term,  but  fluctuates  due  to  its  direct  tracking  of                                    
and  .  In  the  model,   is  meant  to  represent  a  medium-term  interest  rate  factor  while   is                                     
meant  to  represent  a  long-term  factor.    and    are  correlated  with  correlation  .   
Though  complex  at  first  sight,  the  above  system  of  coupled  SDEs  has  a  very  intuitive                               
interpretation.  Like  explained  in  Tuckman  and  Serrat,   is  meant  to  reflect  long-term  trends                             
in  demographics,  productivity,  or  technology,  or  other  factors  that  influence  the  long-run  real                           
interest  rate;  since  these  things  are,  by  nature,  not  very  volatile,   should  be  low.  Moving  on                                   
to  the  next  equation,   is  meant  to  reflect  monetary  cycles  around  that  long-term  trend,  and                                 
will  hence  fluctuate  around  the  value  of  ;  since  monetary  cycles  are,  by  nature,  short-lived                               
and  volatile,  both   and   ought  to  be  relatively  high.  Finally,  the  process  for   is  meant                                     
to  reflect  the  behaviour  of  a  central  bank  that  pegs  the  short  rate  at  a  level  consistent  with  the                                       
state  of  the  monetary  cycle  which,  then,  implies  that   should  be  relatively  high.  Notice  that                                 
the  process  for    has  no  stochastic  term,  which  is  consistent  with  its  interpretation.   
With  the  short-rate  process  from  equation  3.9,  spot  rates  in  the  three-factor  model  are                             
given  by  the  formula  in  Appendix  8.1.  This  formula  is  a  function  of  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,                                       
and  ,  as  well  as  the  initial  values  of  the  model’s  three  factors.  Next,  since  par  swap  rates  can                                       
be  written  as  a  function  of  the  spot  rates  over  the  swap’s  term,  one  may  derive  model-implied                                   
par  swap  rates.  These  model-implied  swap  rates  can  then  be  compared  with  market-observed                           
par  swap  rates.  This  is  typically  done  by  calibrating  the  initial  values  of  the  three  factors  such                                   
that  three  swap  rates  implied  by  the  model  match  three  swap  rates  in  the  market;  in  that  way,                                     
model  rates  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  current  term  structure  of  par  swap  rates.   
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With  the  short-rate  process  specified  as  above,  the  model  is  able  to  match  a  variety  of                                 
term  structure  shapes  only  by  changing  the  initial  value  of  the  three  factors  (and  not  the  fixed                                   
parameters).  One  example  is  given  in Figure  3.4  below,  where  the  factors  are  calibrated  to  the                                 
1-,  10-,  and  30-year  USD  swap  rates  on  Feb.  24,  2020.  The  model  has  no  difficulty  producing                                  
an  “inverted”  yield  curve;  in  this  example,  the  initial  value  of   is  higher  than  ,  while                                      
is  lower  than    –  thus,    first  falls  toward    but  then  increases  as    increases.   
  
Figure  3.4   
  
This  figure  shows  the  three-factor  model  fitted  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year  USD  swap  rates  on  02/24/2020.   
  
With  the  spot  rate  specification  in  Section  8.1,  the  term  structure  is  a  function  of  three                                 
affine  factors  –  not  the  original  ,  ,  and  .  These  three  factors,  ,  ,  and  ,  are  a  result                                         
of  a  “reduced  form”-transformation  of  the  model.  Even  though  they  no  longer  have  the  exact                               
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same  interpretation  as  ,  ,  and  ,  we  will  refer  to  them  as  such  so  as  to  not  overwhelm  the                                         
reader  with  mathematical  detail.  In  any  case,  the  spot  rate  function  (and,  as  a  result,  the  swap                                   
rate  function)  can  be  differentiated  with  respect  to  the  initial  values  of  the  three  factors  to  see                                   
how  a  change  in  a  factor’s  initial  value  impacts  swap  rates  of  various  terms;  this  is  illustrated                                   
in  Figure  3.5  below,  which  is  based  on  a  particular  parameterization  of  the  three-factor  model                               
(we  will  return  to  the  subject  of  parameterization).  Here,  the  “long-term”-factor  creates  a  near                             
parallel  shift,  while  the  other  two  factors  create  a  flattening/steepening  of  the  curve.  Looking                             
back  to  Section  3.2.1,  the  shift  caused  by  the  long-term  factor  is  reminiscent  of  the  level  shift,                                   
while  the  shift  caused  by  the  medium-term  factor  is  reminiscent  of  the  slope  shift  (if  rotated).                                 
Thus,  hedging  these  two  rate  factors  is  reminiscent  of  hedging  to  the  first  two  PCs.   
  
Figure  3.5   
  
This  figure  shows  the  derivatives  of  swap  rates  with  respect  to  factor  values  in  the  three-factor  model  (for  USD).   
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4  Yield  Curve  Arbitrage   
There  is  no  general  definition  of  yield  curve  arbitrage.  Rather,  the  term  encompasses  a                             
family  of  strategies  in  which  investors  take  a  view  on  the  relative  value  of  a  bond  (or  a  swap)                                       
versus  other  bonds  (or  other  swaps).  Such  strategies  may  involve  the  identification  of  “cheap”                             
and  “rich”  maturities  along  the  yield  curve,  be  it  an  on-the-run  Treasury  bond  curve  or  a  swap                                   
curve;  it  may  also  involve  identifying  “cheap”  and  “rich”  bonds  that  are  very  similar  but  that                                 
differ  in  price  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  for  instance  on-/off-the-run  features  or  “specialness”  in                               
the  repo  markets.  In  any  case,  the  investor  would  go  long  the  cheap  security  and  short  the  rich                                     
security  in  such  a  way  that  the  portfolio  is  not  exposed  to  general  interest  rate  movements  but                                   
only  to  the  convergence  (or  divergence)  of  the  cheap  to  the  rich  security.  Here,  the  “investor”                                 
would  typically  be  a  dealer  or  market  maker  who  follows  the  market  closely  and  who,  for  this                                   
reason,  will  be  in  a  favorable  position  to  identify,  and  profit  from,  mispricings;  the  “investor”                               
could  also  be  a  fixed  income  relative  value  hedge  fund  or  a  proprietary  trading  desk  within  an                                   
investment  bank.  In  this  thesis  we  will  concentrate  on  the  first  version  of  the  strategy,  namely                                 
the  identification  of  cheap  and  rich  points  along  the  term  structure;  in  addition,  the  thesis  will                                 
focus  exclusively  on  interest  rate  swaps  since  the  market  has  become  the  de  facto  interest  rate                                 
benchmark  in  many  currencies  over  the  past  couple  of  decades  (PIMCO,  2020).   
The  identification  of  cheap  and  rich  points  on  the  swap  curve  can  be  based  on  a  priori                                   
views  about  the  path  of  future  interest  rates,  or  it  can  be  based  on  a  term  structure  model  like                                       
one  of  the  ones  from  the  previous  section.  Since  the  first  approach  is  inherently  too  subjective                                 
for  a  quantitative  analysis,  the  thesis  will  focus  on  the  latter  approach.  Normally,  this  involves                              
calibrating  a  model  to  match  a  set  of  liquid  market  rates  in  order  to  evaluate  the  cheapness  or                                     
richness  of  less  liquid  market  rates,  and  usually  proceeds  in  the  following  steps:   
  
1. The  initial  values  of  the  factors  are  calibrated  in  such  a  way  that  swap  rates  implied  by                                   
the  model  match  the  most  liquid  swap  rates  in  the  market,  typically  the  1-,  2-,  5-,  10-,                                   
or  30-year  par  swap  rates.   
2. With  the  calibrated  model,  swap  rates  of  other  maturities  are  classified  as  either  cheap                             
(i.e.  market  rates  above  model  rates)  or  rich  (i.e.  market  rates  below  model  rates).   
3. When  the  cheapness  (richness)  exceeds  a  set  threshold,  a  portfolio  is  formed  by  going                             
long  (short)  the  relevant  swap  rate;  here,  going  long  implies  receiving  fixed  and  going                             
short  means  paying  fixed.  Then,  offsetting  positions  in  the  most  liquid  swaps  are  used                             
to  hedge  interest  rate  risk.   
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Looking  at  Figure  4.1  –  where  a  particular  parameterization  of  the  three-factor  model                           
has  been  fitted  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year  USD  swap  rates  on  Mar.  12,  2015  –  the  2-  to                                           
9-year  segment  would  be  classified  as  cheap  while  12-,  15-,  and  20-year  swap  rates  would  be                                 
classified  as  rich.  To  take  an  example  of  a  trade,  an  investor  could  decide  to  receive  fixed  in  a                                       
4-year  swap  and  zero  out  the  resulting  factor  risk  by  paying  fixed  on  a  portfolio  of  1-  and  10-                                       
year  swaps;  the  trade  should  prove  to  be  profitable  if  the  4-year  swap  rate  declines  relative  to                                   
the  1-  and  10-year  swap  rates,  i.e.  if  it  converges  to  its  “fair  value”  in  the  model.   
  
Figure  4.1   
  
This  figure  shows  the  three-factor  model  fitted  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year  USD  swap  rates  on  03/12/2015.   
  
Positions  are  held  until  the  relevant  swap  rate  converges  to  the  model’s  representation                           
of  fair  value  or,  if  it  does  not  converge,  until  a  certain  amount  of  time  has  passed.  Because  the                                       
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exposure  to  the  interest  rate  factors  in  the  model  is  hedged  out,  the  positions  are  only  exposed                                   
to  the  convergence  (or  divergence)  of  the  cheap  or  rich  swap  rates  towards  “fair  rates”;  in  this                                   
way,  parallel  shifts  or  a  steepening  of  the  curve  should  not  lead  to  profit  nor  loss.  Still,  hedges                                     
are  only  locally  effective  since  they  are  calculated  from  derivatives  of  swap  rates  with  respect                               
to  factor  values,  so  large  changes  in  factor  values  could  definitely  lead  to  issues.   
Some  of  the  steps  outlined  above  deserves  further  explanation.  By  calibrating  a  model                           
so  as  to  match  the  most  liquid  swap  rates  in  the  market,  one  implicitly  makes  the  assumption                                   
that  these  swap  rates  are  fair;  in  other  words,  they  are  neither  cheap  nor  rich  in  the  context  of                                       
the  model.  The  justification  for  this  assumption  is  that  these  swap  rates  are  broadly  analyzed,                               
monitored,  and  traded,  and  should  therefore  not  deviate  far  from  “fair  value”.  In  this  way,  the                                 
model  incorporates  the  most  reliable  market  information  but  at  the  same  time  allows  for  other                               
swap  rates  to  be  cheap  or  rich;  an  alternative  approach  would  be  to  calibrate  the  factors  so  as                                    
to  minimize  deviations  between  market  and  model  rates  over  the  whole  curve,  but  this  would                               
presume  that  all  observed  swap  rates  are  equally  fair.  Since  some  swap  rates  are  more  heavily                                 
watched  than  others,  the  first  method  is,  in  our  view,  easier  to  justify.  Besides,  by  matching  a                                   
set  of  market  rates  exactly,  an  investor  can  use  those  swaps  to  hedge  out  residual  interest  rate                                   
risk  without  having  to  worry  about  the  cheapness  or  richness  of  the  hedging  instruments:  they                               
are,  from  construction,  neither  cheap  nor  rich  in  the  context  of  the  fitted  model. 4   
The  constant  parameters  of  the  model,  including  mean-reversion/volatility  parameters,                   
are  typically  estimated  based  on  historical  data  or  implied  from  the  prices  of  traded  volatility                               
products,  like  caplets  or  swaptions. 5  To  the  extent  that  the  model  and  its  parameters  reflect  the                                 
real-world  dynamics  of  the  interest  rate  process,  it  should  be  able  to  identify  which  segments                              
are  cheap  or  rich,  and  hedges  should  work  well.  However,  if  the  model’s  assumptions  are  not                                 
a  suitable  description  of  reality,  or  if  the  estimated  parameters  are  inappropriate,  its  predictive                             
power  will  be  limited;  particular  segments  of  the  swap  curve  will  always  appear  cheap  or  rich                                 
and  hedges  will  not  work  that  well.  Moreover,  even  though  the  model  is  a  suitable  description                                 
of  reality,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the  estimated  parameters  are  “outdated”;  central  bank  policy                                 
may  have  forever  changed  the  mean-reversion  speed  of  the  posited  interest  rate  factors  or  the                               
level  of  interest  rate  volatility,  to  take  but  one  example.  Hence,  it  is  critical  to  employ  a  model                                     
that  is  flexible  enough  to  capture  real-world  term  structure  movements;  nonetheless,  it  cannot                           
be  too  flexible  because  more  flexibility  invariably  leads  to  too  many  parameters.   
4  For  instance,  if  the  model  is  fitted  to  the  1-,  10-  and  30-year  swap  rates  those  rates  are  always  fair  in  the  model.   
5  One  estimation  methodology  in  presented  in  Section  5.2.   
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While  there  are  few  papers  in  the  finance  literature  that  focus  on  these  types  of  trading                                 
strategies,  a  review  of  earlier  findings  is  warranted.  The  most  related  analysis  is  DLY  (2004),                               
which  was  discussed  earlier  in  the  paper.  In  DLY,  they  implement  a  yield  curve  strategy  along                                 
the  lines  outlined  above  using  the  two-factor  Vasicek  model  and  USD  swap  market  data  from                               
1988  to  2004;  they  find  that  the  strategy  produces  positive  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  with  a                               
“low  degree  of  exposure  to  risk  factors”.  In  Fabozzi,  Martellini  and  Priaulet  (2005)  they  use  a                                 
statistical  model,  based  on  a  set  of  economic  variables,  to  forecast  changes  in  the  slope  of  the                                   
term  structure;  trading  strategies,  such  as  butterfly  swaps,  are  then  implemented  based  on  the                             
model’s  prediction.  Fabozzi  et  al.  show  that  such  strategies  perform  well,  which  suggests  that                             
the  slope  of  the  term  structure  may  be  predictable.  To  our  knowledge,  these  are  the  only  well-                                   
known  papers  that  examine  the  performance  of  quantitative  yield  curve  strategies,  despite  the                           
pervasiveness  of  such  strategies  amongst  relative  value  hedge  funds  and  traders.   
  
5  Methodology   
5.1  Return  Series  Construction   
In  order  to  analyze  the  risk  and  return  of  yield  curve  arbitrage,  we  first  implement  the                                 
strategy  on  historical  data.  For  this,  we  follow  the  methodology  outlined  in  DLY,  but  improve                               
upon  their  implementation  where  we  feel  improvement  is  necessary.  Here,  the  short-term  rate                           
is  assumed  to  evolve  according  to  the  three-factor  model  of  Section  3.2.4,  where  formulas  for                               
spot  rates  (and  hence  swap  rates)  are  given  in  Section  8.1.  With  end-of-day  bid  and  ask  dealer                                   
quotes  (at  a  daily  frequency)  from  Jan.  2,  2006  to  Sep.  18,  2020  for  USD  and  EUR  par  swaps,                                       
we  calibrate  the  initial  value  of  the  three  factors  to  match  the  mid-market  1-,  10-,  and  30-year                                   
swap  rates  in  each  currency. 6  Then,  for  each  currency,  we  classify  the  remaining  swap  rates  –                                 
in  our  case  the  2-,  3-,  4-,  5-,  6-,  7-,  8-,  9-,  12-,  15-,  and  20-year  rates  –  as  either  cheap  or  rich.                                               
If  the  cheapness  (richness)  exceeds  a  certain  threshold,  we  receive  (pay)  fixed  in  the  relevant                               
6  The  swap  quotes  are  from  Bloomberg.  The  fixed  leg  of  USD  interest  rate  swaps  accrues  on  a  30/360  basis  with                                           
semi-annual  payments  while  the  floating  leg  accrues  on  an  ACT/360  basis  with  quarterly  payments  based  on  the                                   
value  of  3-month  USD-LIBOR.  The  fixed  leg  of  EUR  interest  rate  swaps  accrues  on  a  30/360  basis  with  a  single                                         
payment  every  year  while  the  floating  leg  accrues  on  an  ACT/360  basis  with  semi-annual  payments  based  on  the                                     
value  of  6-month  EURIBOR.  In  both  the  USD  and  EUR  markets,  the  floating  rate  is  set  two  business  days  prior                                         
to  the  start  of  the  accrual  period  and  is  paid  in  arrears.  Moreover,  both  markets  follow  the  “Modified  Following”                                       
convention,  where  a  payment  that  falls  on  a  non-business  day  is  pushed  to  the  next  business  day,  unless  that  day                                         
is  in  a  different  month  (in  which  case  it  is  brought  forward  to  the  first  business  day  preceding  the  payment  date).   
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swap. 7  Maturities  from  2  to  9  years  are  hedged  with  a  portfolio  of  1-  and  10-year  swaps  while                                     
12-,  15-,  and  20-year  swaps  are  hedged  with  a  portfolio  of  10-  and  30-year  swaps;  the  hedges                                   
are  given  by  the  derivatives  of  swap  values  with  respect  to  the  long-  and  medium-term  factors                                 
of  the  three-factor  model.  Positions  are  then  held  until  the  relevant  swap  rate  converges  to  the                                 
model’s  fair  value  or  until  a  full  calendar  year  has  passed.  We  do  not  allow  for  more  than  one                                       
position  in  the  same  swap  rate  at  the  same  time;  in  other  words,  if  we  have  taken  a  position  in                                         
a  5-year  swap,  we  are  not  allowed  to  take  a  new  position  in  the  5-year  swap  until  the  existing                                       
position  is  closed/unwound. 8  Thus,  the  return  index  is  constructed  from  the  point  of  view  of  a                                
single  hedge  fund  who  trades  the  USD  and  EUR  swap  markets  on  a  daily  basis.   
In  the  implementations  we  are  careful  to  take  into  account  every  practical  detail  of  the                               
USD  and  EUR  swap  markets,  including  day-count  conventions,  holidays,  non-business  days,                       
payment  frequencies,  and  spot  settlement. 9  In  computing  floating  leg  payments  we  are  careful                           
to  follow  the  precise  fixing  conventions  of  the  markets;  daily  fixes  for  3-month  USD-LIBOR                             
and  6-month  EURIBOR  are  obtained  from  Bloomberg  and  ICE.  Swap  positions  are  valued  on                             
a  discount  curve  constructed  according  to  industry  standards  (see  Section  8.2  for  more  details                            
on  the  methodology).  Hence,  since  positions  are  initiated  and  valued  on  a  daily  basis,  the  PnL                                 
should  closely  resemble  that  of  a  hedge  fund  pursuing  the  same  exact  strategy  (with  the  same                                 
inputs,  models,  etc.).  In  our  view,  this  is  an  improvement  over  DLY’s  implementation,  where                             
they  ignore  most  of  the  above  details  and  where  they  use  monthly  observations.   
Like  in  DLY,  the  hedges  are  designed  so  as  to  neutralize  the  exposure  to  the  factors  of                                   
the  model.  However,  we  only  hedge  the  exposure  to  the  medium-and  long-term  factors  of  the                               
three-factor  model  since,  as  seen  earlier  in  Figure  3.5 ,  hedge  ratios  from  the  short-term  factor                               
are  typically  very  similar  to  hedge  ratios  from  the  medium-term  factor  (since   and   are                                 
often  close).  Mathematically,  we  solve  the  below  linear  system  for    and  :   
  
  ,   
  
where    is  the  model  swap  value  for  term  ,    is  the  medium-term  factor,    is  the  long-    
7  The  threshold  is  10  basis  points  for  2-,  3-,  4-,  5-,  6-  and  7-year  swaps,  and  5  basis  points  for  8-,  9-,  12-,  15-  and                                                     
20-year  swaps.  The  threshold  is  lower  for  the  latter  group  because  the  deviation  between  market  and  model  rates                                     
is  typically  much  lower  for  that  group,  than  for  the  first  group.   
8  This  only  applies  to  the  same  swap  rate  in  the  same  currency.   
9  USD  swaps  follow  the  NYC  and  London  holiday  calendars.  EUR  swaps  follow  the  TARGET  holiday  calendar.   
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term  factor,   is  1  (or  10  years),   is  10  (or  30  years),   is  the  term  of  the  cheap/rich  swaps,                                             
 is  the  notional  of  the  -year  swap,   is  the  notional  of  the  -year  swap,  while   is  the                                         
notional  of  the  -year  swap  (which  we  fix  to  be  100).  Of  course,  the  solution  is   
  
  .   
  
Moving  on,  we  first  calculate  the  daily  PnL  of  the  strategy;  from  this  daily  PnL  series                                 
we  calculate  end-of-month  PnL  and  then  monthly  returns.  In  both  the  USD  and  EUR  market,                               
the  initial  amount  of  capital  is  set  so  that  the  the  strategies  produce  an  annual  return  volatility                                   
of  12%  (3.464%  per  month).  In  addition,  an  equal-weight,  monthly  return  series  is  formed  by                               
investing  50%  in  each  market;  this  return  series  is  scaled  to  have  a  volatility  of  12%  per  year                                     
by  scaling  the  individual  strategies  by  x %  (where  x  is  greater  than  100  since  the  two  strategies                                   
are  not  perfectly  correlated).  Hence,  even  though  the  strategy  is  implemented  on  a  daily  basis                               
we  report  statistics  for  monthly  returns  as  that  is  the  normal  reporting  frequency.   
Since  we  use  bid  and  ask  dealer  quotes,  transaction  costs  should  be  realistic.  In  reality,                               
however,  all  investors  might  not  be  able  to  transact  at  those  quotes  but  they  should  be  realistic                                   
from  the  perspective  of  a  large  market  player;  besides,  bid-ask  spreads  for  USD  and  EUR  par                                 
swaps  are  very  tight,  as  seen  from  Figure  5.1 .  For  USD  swaps,  spreads  are  usually  less  than  a                                     
single  basis  point;  for  EUR  swaps,  spreads  are  usually  between  1-4  basis  points.   
  
Figure  5.1   
  
This  figure  shows  the  200-day  rolling  average  bid-ask  spread  for  2-,  5-,  10-,  and  30-year  EUR  and  USD  swaps.   
27   
  
5.2  Parameter  Calibration   
So  far,  the  constant  parameters  of  the  three-factor  model  –  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,                                 
and   –  have  been  taken  as  given.  In  reality,  however,  these  parameters  need  to  be  estimated.                                   
For  this,  we  adopt  the  estimation  procedure  suggested  in  DLY  (2004),  which  proceeds  in  four                               
steps:   
1. Choose  a  trial  value  of  the  parameters.   
2. For  every  swap  curve  in  the  sample  period:   
2.1. Calibrate  the  initial  value  of  the  three  factors  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year                               




where   is  the  estimated  swap  rate  for  term  ,   is  the  market  swap                               
rate  for  term  ,  and    is  in  {1,  10,  30}.   
  
2.2. Estimate  swap  rates  for  the  remaining  terms  (with  ,  ,  and    from  above).   
2.3. Sum  the  square  percentage  error  between  the  estimated  swap  rates  and  market                         




where   is  the  estimated  swap  rate  for  term  ,   is  the  market  swap                               
rate  for  term  ,  and    is  in  {2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  12,  15,  20}.   
  
3. Sum  the  total  error  across  all  swap  curves  in  the  sample  period.   
4. Update  the  values  of  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  and  ,  and  repeat  steps  2-4.   
  
The  algorithm  is  repeated  until  the  global  minimum  is  reached.  To  solve  the  problem,                             
we  rely  on  the  heuristic  optimization  method  of  Storn  and  Price  (1997)  through  the  DEoptim                               
package  in  R .  We  further  impose  the  following  constraint:  ,  ,  . 10   
10  We  also  impose  reasonable  bound  constraints.   
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With  end-of-month,  mid-market  USD  and  EUR  par  swap  rates  from  Jan.  2006  to  Aug.                             
2020,  we  estimate  a  set  of  parameters  for  each  currency.  Like  in  DLY,  the  constant  parameters                                 
are  estimated  from  in-sample  data;  this  may  seem  like  “cheating”,  since  the  seven  parameters                             
are  estimated  from  data  to  which  the  trading  strategy  is  later  applied.  In  reality,  however,  one                                 
would  probably  reestimate  and  update  these  parameters  from  time  to  time,  particularly  after  a                             
change  of  regime;  as  a  result,  it  would  be  quite  unrealistic  to  use  parameters  estimated  from  a                                   
pre-2006  sample  over  the  entire  2006-20  sample  period.  Of  course,  the  parameters  could  have                             
been  reestimated  quarterly  or  yearly,  but  that  is,  in  our  case,  computationally  not  feasible;  it  is                                 
therefore,  in  our  view,  more  realistic  to  estimate  the  parameters  from  in-sample  data  since  we                               
are  restricted  to  a  single  set  of  parameters.   
While  the  estimation  procedure  described  above  is  attractive  for  our  purposes,  we  will                           
end  this  section  with  a  brief  discussion  of  alternative  estimation  methods.  If  the  term  structure                               
model  at  hand  allows  for  closed-form  solutions  to  option  prices,  e.g.  European  swaptions,  one                             
could  estimate  the  parameters  by  minimizing  the  sum  of  squared  errors  between  option  prices                             
implied  by  the  model  and  option  prices  observed  in  the  market.  However,  this  would  involve                               
frequent  reestimation,  and  parameters  could  be  volatile;  besides,  there  need  not  be  a  clear  link                               
between,  on  the  one  hand,  mean-reversion  and  volatility  parameters  implied  by  options  prices                           
and,  on  the  other  hand,  mean-reversion  and  volatility  parameters  implied  by  the  overall  shape                             
of  the  term  structure.  Indeed  that  would  be  to  take  the  model  too  literally.  Hence,  for  our  task,                                     
the  estimation  procedure  suggested  in  DLY  seems  more  attractive;  here,  the  parameters  are  in                             
effect  estimated  to  maximize  the  model  fit.   
  
Table  5.1   
Estimated  Parameters  for  the  Three-Factor  Model  for  USD  and  EUR  Swap  Markets   
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Parameter    USD    EUR   
   0.036338    0.041238   
   0.371104    0.222642   
   0.363822    0.045252   
   0.018292    0.014048   
   0.058384    0.036982   
   0.006688    0.015962   
   -0.138732    -0.938070   
  
6  Results   
6.1  Return   
In  Table  6.2  (pp.  34),  we  present  summary  statistics  for  the  USD  and  EUR  yield  curve                                 
strategies.  Results  are  presented  both  for  the  complete  sample  period  (2006-2020)  and  for  two                             
subperiods,  the  first  from  2006  to  2012  and  the  second  from  2013  to  2020.  The  USD  strategy                                   
performs  quite  well,  with  a  mean  excess  return  of  0.462%  per  month;  since  it  has  been  scaled                                   
to  produce  a  return  volatility  of  12%  per  year  (3.464%  per  month),  this  implies  a  Sharpe  ratio                                   
of  0.462. 11  Over  the  2006-2012  sample  the  mean  excess  return  is  higher  at  0.907%  per  month;                                 
the  return  volatility  is  higher  too,  but  the  Sharpe  ratio  still  climbs  to  0.677.  The  excess  return |                                   
is  in  both  cases  statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.  Over  the  2013-2020  sample  there  is  a                                   
clear  deterioration  in  performance,  with  a  mean  excess  return  that  is  statistically  insignificant                           
and  a  Sharpe  ratio  of  just  0.118.  Volatility  also  declines.   
Like  for  the  USD  strategy,  the  performance  of  the  EUR  strategy  is  better  over  the  first                                 
half  of  the  sample  than  over  the  second  half.  Nevertheless,  the  EUR  strategy  performs  poorly,                               
with  a  mean  excess  return  of  0.152%  and  a  Sharpe  ratio  of  0.152;  the  mean  is  not  statistically                                     
significant,  neither  over  the  full  sample  nor  over  the  two  subsamples.  Return  volatility  is  also                               
much  lower  over  the  second  half  of  the  sample,  like  for  the  case  of  USD;  for  EUR,  the  return                                       
volatility  over  the  second  half  of  the  sample  (1.402%)  is  under  one  third  of  the  volatility  over                                   
the  first  half  of  the  sample  period  (4.819%).  The  ratio  of  negative  to  positive  monthly  returns                                 
is  also  above  0.5.  For  USD,  that  ratio  is  well  below  0.5.   
Looking  at  the  other  summary  statistics,  the  USD  and  EUR  return  series  have  positive                             
skewness  and  more  kurtosis  than  would  be  the  case  for  a  normal  distribution.  In  this  case,  the                                   
positive  skewness  suggests  that  the  strategies  are  not  merely  designed  to  earn  a  small  positive                               
return  most  of  the  time,  only  to  suffer  large  losses  in  times  of  market  turmoil.  Indeed,  looking                                   
at  the  table,  we  see  that  the  maximum  monthly  return  for  both  the  USD  and  EUR  strategies  is                                     
higher  than  the  minimum  monthly  return  (i.e.  maximum  monthly  loss).  For  instance,  the  USD                             
strategy  has  a  maximum  monthly  gain  of  16.158%  over  the  entire  sample  while  the  maximum                               
monthly  loss  is  -11.994%;  the  EUR  strategy,  on  the  other  hand,  has  a  maximum  monthly  gain                                 
of  20.989%  and  a  maximum  monthly  loss  of  -11.739%.   
  
11  We  report  the  annualized  Sharpe  ratio.  When  return  volatility  is  12.0%  per  year,  the  annualized  Sharpe  ratio  is                                       
equal  to  the  mean  monthly  return  multiplied  by  100.   
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Figure  6.1   
  
This  figure  shows  the  monthly  excess  returns  of  the  USD  yield  curve  strategy.   
  
  
Figure  6.2   
  
This  figure  shows  the  12-month  excess  return  of  the  USD  yield  curve  strategy.   
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Figure  6.3   
  
This  figure  shows  the  monthly  excess  returns  of  the  EUR  yield  curve  strategy.   
  
  
Figure  6.4   
  
This  figure  shows  the  12-month  excess  return  of  the  EUR  yield  curve  strategy.      
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Table  6.1   
Descriptive  Statistics  for  Model-Market  Swap  Rate  Errors   
  
  
This  table  reports  summary  statistics  for  deviations  (in  basis  points)  between  swap  rates  implied  by  the  three-factor  model  and  swap  rates  observed  in  the  market  for  2-,  3-,  4-,                                                           




EUR  Rate    n    Mean    Median    Standard   
Deviation   
Minimum    Maximum    USD  Rate    n    Mean    Median    Standard   
Deviation   
Minimum    Maximum   
EUR-02Y    3752    -1.94    -2.06    9.73    -30.12    35.06    USD-02Y    3608    -4.64    -6.36    11.21    -34.82    44.07   
EUR-03Y    3752    -4.61    -4.54    12.01    -41.94    25.74    USD-03Y    3608    -7.49    -9.86    13.81    -46.84    33.37   
EUR-04Y    3752    -6.22    -5.52    11.45    -41.85    20.45    USD-04Y    3608    -8.23    -10.88    12.77    -44.99    28.72   
EUR-05Y    3752    -6.65    -5.78    9.68    -35.27    13.99    USD-05Y    3608    -7.70    -9.59    10.14    -36.07    20.39   
EUR-06Y    3752    -6.10    -5.24    7.56    -28.50    11.45    USD-06Y    3608    -6.57    -7.50    7.29    -27.10    15.92   
EUR-07Y    3752    -4.87    -4.26    5.42    -20.72    8.88    USD-07Y    3608    -4.97    -5.36    4.80    -18.81    10.65   
EUR-08Y    3752    -3.26    -2.87    3.35    -17.10    5.88    USD-08Y    3608    -3.10    -3.24    2.83    -11.17    6.66   
EUR-09Y    3752    -1.58    -1.41    1.57    -14.84    4.18    USD-09Y    3608    -1.37    -1.42    1.28    -5.07    3.66   
EUR-12Y    3752    2.27    1.98    2.18    -11.03    8.06    USD-12Y    3608    1.68    1.71    1.84    -5.49    6.50   
EUR-15Y    3752    4.14    3.76    3.62    -11.20    14.19    USD-15Y    3608    3.20    3.25    2.89    -7.94    10.04   
EUR-20Y    3752    4.88    4.55    3.33    -12.06    14.94    USD-20Y    3608    4.38    4.10    2.18    -3.64    10.65   
  
Table  6.2   
Descriptive  Statistics  for  Yield  Curve  Arbitrage  Strategies   
  
  
This  table  reports  summary  statistics  for  monthly  percentage  excess  returns  of  the  yield  curve  strategies.  EW  is  an  equally-weighted  portfolio  of  the  USD  and  EUR  strategies.                                                     
Capital  is  the  initial  amount  required  per  100  notional  to  generate  a  12%  annualized  volatility.  “Ratio  Negative”  is  the  proportion  of  negative  returns  while  Sharpe  Ratio  is  the                                                         




Market    n    Capital    Mean    t -Statistic    Standard   
Deviation   




Sharpe  Ratio   
EUR    175    39.216    0.152    0.58    3.464    -11.739    20.989    1.647    12.973    0.520    0.012    0.152   
EUR   
(2006-2012)   
83    -    0.326    0.62    4.819    -11.739    20.989    1.196    7.152    0.542    0.017    0.235   
EUR   
(2013-2020)   
92    -    -0.005    -0.03    1.402    -5.535    6.114    0.259    8.006    0.500    -0.072    -0.012   
USD    175    25.878    0.462    1.77    3.464    -11.994    16.158    0.402    7.235    0.440    0.094    0.462   
USD   
(2006-2012)   
83    -    0.907    1.78    4.636    -11.994    16.158    0.103    4.614    0.386    0.117    0.677   
USD   
(2013-2020)   
92    -    0.061    0.33    1.799    -5.932    5.138    0.133    4.040    0.489    -0.149    0.118   
EW    175    -    0.386    1.48    3.464    -12.212    19.829    1.213    10.129    0.509    0.093    0.386   
EW   
(2006-2012)   
83    -    0.775    1.49    4.753    -12.212    19.829    0.778    5.751    0.482    0.097    0.565   
EW   
(2013-2020)   
92    -    0.035    0.22    1.526    -4.532    4.884    -0.004    4.505    0.533    -0.054    0.081   
  
Moving  on,  it  is  worth  analyzing  why  the  EUR  strategy  underperforms  compared  with                           
the  USD  strategy,  and  why,  for  both  strategies,  the  performance  is  better  in  the  first  half  of  the                                     
sample  than  in  the  second  half.  On  the  topic  of  the  first  question  it  is  difficult  to  identify  what                                       
is  the  exact  source  of  EUR  underperformance,  but  a  few  issues  are  definitely  discernible  if  we                                 
take  a  look  at  Figure  6.6  on  the  next  page  in  conjunction  with  Table  5.1  (pp.  29).  Firstly,  over                                       
the  period  following  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009  up  until  the  mid-2010s,  the  swap  curve                               
has  an  abnormal  shape.  In  Figure  6.6 ,  which  shows  the  EUR  swap  curve  on  Jan.  10,  2012,  the                                     
20-  and  30-year  swap  rates  are  low  relative  to  intermediate-term  rates,  which  leads  to  implied                               
forward  rates  being  steeply  downward-sloping  from  12  years  out,  out  to  30  years.  To  be  clear,                                 
the  model  has  no  trouble  fitting  this  swap  curve,  but  the  abnormal  shape  impacts  the  values  of                                   
the  model’s  constant  parameters.  Looking  back  to  Table  5.1 ,  we  see  that   is  low  for  EUR                                   
compared  with  the  USD  market;  in  fact,  the  half-life  implied  by  the  value  of   in  the  EUR                                     
market  is  15.32  years! 12  In  other  words,  the  abnormal,  downward-sloping  EUR  forward  curve                           
necessitates  a  very  low   since  the  influence  of  the  medium-term  factor  is  required  beyond                               
the  intermediate-term  segment  in  order  to  generate  an  inflection  point  on  the  forward  curve  in                               
the  20-year  range.  This,  however,  comes  at  a  cost:  the  medium-term  factor  is  no  longer  suited                                 
to  describe  the  intermediate-term  segment  of  the  swap  curve  and  so,  as  a  result,  swap  rates  in                                   
the  2-  to  9-year  segment  are  more  frequently  mispriced.  
Not  only  does  the  EUR  model  parameterization  lead  to  mispricing,  but  it  also  leads  to                               
hedges  being  less  effective.  Once  again,  the  culprit  is  –  due  to  its  low  value,  the  medium-                                     
term  factor  more  or  less  becomes  a  long-term  factor  and,  as  a  result,   and   become  more                                     
equal.  Since  positions  are  hedged  by  zeroing  out  the  exposures  to   and  ,  portfolios  are  in                                   
this  case  predominantly  protected  against  parallel  shifts.  This  is  depicted  in  Figure  6.7  below,                             
which  shows  the  factor  loadings  in  the  EUR  parameterization  of  the  three-factor  model;  here,                             
 and   impact  swap  rates  in  a  rather  similar  manner.  The  short-term  factor  now  looks  like                                   
the  medium-term  factor  in  USD,  which  may  suggest  that  we  should  hedge  out  that  factor  (and                                 
not  );  this,  however,  does  not  yield  any  improvement.  Of  course,  another  possibility  would                             
be  to  zero  out  the  exposure  to  all  three  factors  of  the  model  with  a  combination  of  1-,  10-,  and                                         
30-year  swaps  for  every  cheap  or  rich  swap.  This  method  was  tested  out,  but  did  not  improve                                   
on  the  original  results;  in  this  case,  even  more  swaps  are  added  to  the  overall  portfolio,  which                                   
introduces  more  interest  rate  risk  along  the  whole  curve.   
    
12  We  will  not  get  into  the  details  here,  but  the  half-life  is  found  by  solving  exp[-α  *  t ]  =  0.50  for  t ,  where  α  is  the                                                      
mean-reversion  speed.   
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Figure  6.5   
  
This  figure  shows  the  three-factor  model  fitted  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year  USD  swap  rates  on  01/10/2012.   
  
  
Figure  6.6   
  
This  figure  shows  the  three-factor  model  fitted  to  match  the  1-,  10-,  and  30-year  EUR  swap  rates  on  01/10/2012.  
36   
  
Figure  6.7   
  
This  figure  shows  the  derivatives  of  swap  rates  with  respect  to  factor  values  in  the  three-factor  model  (for  EUR).   
  
Of  course,  if  the  EUR  forward  curve  in  Figure  6.6  is  a  reflection  of  the  expected  value                                   
of  future  short-term  rates,  the  interest  rate  process  of  the  three-factor  model  might  not  be  well                                 
suited  for  the  EUR  market;  in  fact,  an  additional  interest  rate  factor  would  be  needed  to  allow                                   
for  two  inflection  points  on  the  swap  curve.  However,  long-term  swap  rates  did  not  decline  in                                 
the  early  2010s  based  on  market  participants  forecasting  lower  short-term  rates  15  to  30  years                               
into  the  future,  but  rather  as  a  result  of  a  decline  in  the  term  premium.  In  Domanski,  Shin  and                                       
Sushko  (2017),  they  argue  that  this  decline  was  –  in  addition  to  the  ECB’s  quantitative  easing                                 
policies  –  caused  by  insurance  company  and  pension  fund  demand  for  long-duration  assets  to                             
match  their  typical  long-duration  liabilities.  No  matter  the  exact  cause,  a  modeler  would  need                             
to  supplement  the  three-factor  model  with  a  time-varying  risk  premium  in  order  to  capture  the                               
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peculiar  properties  of  the  EUR  swap  curve;  alternatively,  a  modeler  could  ignore  the  long  end                               
of  the  swap  curve  and  only  trade  the  1-  to  10-year  segment  with  the  two-factor  Vasicek  model                                   
fitted  to  match  the,  say,  1-year  and  10-year  market  rates.   
To  summarize,  the  EUR  strategy  underperforms  because  the  three-factor  model  is  not                         
well  suited  to  describe  the  peculiar  shape  of  the  EUR  swap  curve  that  manifests  over  much  of                                   
the  sample  period.  Model  parameters  are  forced  to  take  on  rather  extreme  values,  which  leads                               
to  more  mispricing  and  less  effective  hedge  ratios  than  for  the  USD  case  (where  the  model  is                                   
better  suited  to  describe  the  “real”  interest  rate  process).   
We  end  this  subsection  with  a  discussion  of  why,  for  both  markets,  the  performance  is                               
better  in  the  first  half  of  the  sample  than  in  the  second  half.  The  answer  is  plainly  visible  from                                       
Figure  6.8  and  6.9  on  the  next  page,  which  shows  the  rolling  250-day  volatility  of  select  USD                                   
and  EUR  swap  rates  (in  basis  points  per  year).  In  both  markets  swap  rate  volatility  is  elevated                                   
during  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009  before  it  declines  and  remains  low  for  the  larger  part                                 
of  the  remaining  sample  period;  the  volatility  of  the  2-year  USD  rate,  for  instance,  is  less  than                                   
50  basis  points  per  year  from  2012  up  to  2020.  With  a  low  level  of  volatility,  certain  segments                                     
of  the  swap  curve  may  appear  cheap  or  rich  for  long  periods  of  time  and  the  strategy  becomes                                     
less  profitable;  with  higher  levels  of  volatility  there  is  much  more  movement  around  the  fitted                               
swap  rates,  which  essentially  increases  the  probability  that  certain  segments  of  the  curve  will                             
move  toward  “fair  value”.  When  volatility  is  low,  however,  there  is  limited  movement  around                             
those  fitted  swap  rates,  which  lowers  the  probability  that  cheap  or  rich  segments  will  return  to                                 
their  fair  values  in  the  model  before  a  position  is  closed.   
While  low  levels  of  swap  rate  volatility  is  unfortunate  for  the  strategies,  one  can  make                               
the  argument  that  the  dependence  on  rate  volatility  is  an  attractive  feature.  Like  they  mention                               
in  DLY,  fixed  income  arbitrageurs  are  sometimes  criticized  for  “picking  up  nickels  in  front  of                               
a  steamroller”,  meaning  that  they  tend  to  earn  a  small  positive  return  most  of  the  time  only  to                                     
suffer  huge  losses  in  times  of  market  stress.  Thus,  from  the  perspective  of  a  large  hedge  fund,                                   
which  probably  engages  in  a  lot  of  different  strategies,  a  yield  curve  strategy  may  serve  as  an                                   
important  “diversifier”;  if  the  fund’s  other  strategies  tend  to  be  negatively  correlated  with  the                             
level  of  interest  rate  volatility,  a  yield  curve  strategy  can  help  to  make  the  fund’s  returns  more                                   
“market  neutral”  (or  at  least  cushion  a  loss).  The  fund  could  of  course  remedy  the  problem  by                                   
buying  fixed  income  options,  e.g.  swaptions,  but  that  could  lead  to  steady  losses;  with  a  well-                                 
implemented  yield  curve  strategy,  however,  the  fund  has  the  potential  to  earn  positive  returns                             




Figure  6.8   
  




Figure  6.9   
  
This  figure  shows  the  rolling  250-day  volatility  of  (changes  in)  select  EUR  swap  rates  (in  basis  points  per  year).   
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6.2  Risk   
To  summarize  the  results  of  the  previous  subsection  the  USD  strategy  produces  excess                           
returns  that  are  positive  and  statistically  significant,  with  a  Sharpe  ratio  of  0.462;  by  contrast,                               
the  EUR  strategy  performs  poorly  with  an  insignificant  mean  excess  return  and  a  Sharpe  ratio                               
of  0.152.  Still,  it  remains  to  determine  whether,  especially  for  the  USD  case,  the  excess  return                                 
is  earned  as  compensation  for  bearing  market  risk,  or  if  it  represents  true  “alpha”.  As  a  result,                                   
we  need  to  determine  if  the  residual  risks  of  the  strategies  are  correlated  with  risk  factors  that                                   
have  been  identified  in  the  literature.  To  answer  the  question,  we  regress  the  excess  returns  of                                 
the  strategies  on  the  excess  returns  of  risk  factors  that  are  popular  in  the  literature.  We  control                                   
for  equity  market  risk  through  the  Fama-French  U.S.  and  European  market  portfolios  and  the                             
SMB,  HML,  and  UMD  portfolios  for  each  market;  return  data  for  these  portfolios  is  obtained                               
from  Kenneth  French’s  data  library. 13  Here,  excess  returns  from  the  USD  strategy  is  regressed                             
on  the  U.S.  portfolios,  and  excess  returns  from  the  EUR  strategy  is  regressed  on  the  European                                 
portfolios.  Moreover,  we  include  the  KBW  Bank  Index  or  the  Stoxx  Europe  600  Bank  Index.                               
To  control  for  default  risk,  we  include  the  Bloomberg/Barclays  U.S.  Corporate  Bond  Index  or                             
Euro  Corporate  Bond  Index  (broad  indexes  of  USD  and  EUR-denominated  corporate  bonds).                         
We  control  for  long-term  interest  rate  risk  through  two  indexes  from  Credit  Suisse  which  –  in                                 
our  case  –  are  meant  to  serve  as  proxies  for  an  investment  in  liquid,  long-term  U.S.  Treasuries                                   
and  liquid,  long-term  German  bunds.  We  also  control  for  volatility  risk  through  the  returns  on                               
CBOE’s  VIX  Index  or  the  Stoxx  50  Volatility  Index;  since  there  are  futures  contracts  on  these                                 
indexes,  this  risk  factor  is  tradable  like  the  other  factors.   
The  reason  for  including  financial  stocks  as  a  risk  factor  is  that  financials  can  serve  as                                 
a  proxy  for  financial  sector  risk.  Like  during  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009,  financials  will                               
typically  underperform  if  investors  are  concerned  about  the  health  of  bank  balance  sheets  and                             
the  financial  system  as  a  whole.  In  such  an  environment,  LIBOR  rates  –  which  reflect  banks’                                 
borrowing  costs  –  typically  increase  relative  to  risk-free  rates,  like  OIS  rates.  Therefore,  if  the                               
trading  strategy  is  exposed  to,  say,  the  LIBOR/OIS  spread,  that  risk  should  be  captured  by  the                                 
performance  of  financial  stocks.  Nevertheless,  this  link  is  far  from  perfect  as  financial  stocks                             
are  influenced  by  many  other  variables:  in  Viale,  Kolari  and  Fraser  (2009),  for  example,  they                               
show  that  the  return  on  financial  stocks  are  sensitive  to  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve  (since  the                                     
slope  of  the  yield  curve  affects  banks’  interest  margins).      
13  To  be  specific,  we  use  the  “Fama/French  3  Factors”  and  “Momentum  Factor  (Mom)”  files  for  the  U.S.  market;                                       
for  Europe,  we  use  the  “Fama/French  European  3  Factors”  and  “European  Momentum  Factor  (Mom)”  files.   
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Table  6.3   
Regression  Results  for  Yield  Curve  Arbitrage  Strategies   
  
  
This  table  reports  summary  statistics  for  the  regression  of  monthly  percentage  excess  returns  of  the  yield  curve  strategies  on  the  excess  returns  of  various  risk  factors  that  are                                                         
popular  in  the  literature.  is  the  excess  return  on  the  Fama-French  value-weighted  equity  market  portfolio.  SMB,  HML,  and  UMB  are  the  Fama-French  equity  risk  factors.           RM                                          
is  the  excess  return  on  the  KBW  Bank  Index  (for  USD)  or  the  Stoxx  Europe  600  Bank  Index  (for  EUR).  is  the  excess  return  on  the  Bloomberg  Barclays  U.S.   RBANKS                                          RBONDS                  
Corporate  Bond  Index  (for  USD)  or  the  Bloomberg  Barclays  Euro  Corporate  Bond  Index  (for  EUR). is  the  excess  return  on  Credit  Suisse’s  10-Year  U.S.  Treasury  Note                                 RGOV                      
Futures  Return  Index  (for  USD)  or  Credit  Suisse’s  10-Year  German  Government  Bond  Futures  Return  Index  (for  EUR).  is  the  excess  return  on  CBOE’s  VIX  Index  (for                                     RV OL                  
USD)  or  the  Stoxx  50  Volatility  Index  (for  EUR).  The  t -statistics  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  serial  correlation.  The  sample  period  is  from  Feb  2006  to  Aug  2020.                                                      
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   Intercept       t -Statistics         
Market    α    t -Statistic     RM   SMB    HML    UMD     RBANKS    RBONDS    RGOV   RV OL   F -Statistic     ²R  
EUR    -0.038    -0.11    1.37    -1.50    0.32    -1.88    -1.14    0.27    1.32    1.33    2.43    0.105   
EUR   
(2006-2012)   
-0.384    -0.70    2.24    -1.87    0.06    -1.98    -1.78    0.60    1.38    1.15    2.63    0.221   
EUR   
(2013-2020)   
0.129    0.87    -1.17    0.44    0.15    -1.14    0.57    0.94    -0.45    -0.07    0.70    0.063   
USD    0.426    1.85    -2.35    -1.27    0.72    0.32    1.75    -0.30    3.50    -0.34    6.04    0.226   
USD   
(2006-2012)   
0.711    1.68    -1.21    -1.27    -0.15    0.19    1.55    -0.94    3.01    0.38    3.16    0.255   
USD   
(2013-2020)   
0.248    1.48    -1.36    0.51    1.41    0.38    -1.13    2.11    0.55    -1.26    4.49    0.302   
  
We  present  regression  results  in  Table  6.3  on  the  next  page.  For  the  USD  strategy,  the                                 
risk-adjusted  mean  excess  return  is  0.426%  per  month  over  the  entire  sample  and  0.711%  per                               
month  over  the  first  half  of  the  sample;  in  both  cases,  this  risk-adjusted  mean  excess  return  is                                   
statistically  significant  at  the  10%  level.  Interestingly,  over  the  second  half  of  the  sample,  the                               
risk-adjusted  mean  excess  return  is  higher  than  the  mean  excess  return,  but  the  statistic  is  not                                 
significant  at  common  confidence  levels.  Over  the  full  sample,  the  USD  strategy  is  negatively                             
correlated  with  the  market  portfolio  and  positively  correlated  with  long-term  Treasury  bonds.                         
The  positive  correlation  with  long-term  Treasury  bonds  implies  that  the  hedging  strategy  may                           
not  be  entirely  effective:  if  the  hedging  strategy  was  entirely  effective,  there  would  not  be  any                                 
residual  interest  rate  risk  remaining  on  a  portfolio  level.   
While  the  R²  of  the  USD  strategy  is  relatively  low,  it  is  still  higher  than  what  they  find                                     
in  DLY  (where  the  R²  is  0.097).  Nevertheless,  the  exposures  to  the  risk  factors  are  negative  as                                   
well  as  positive,  and  the  risk-adjusted  mean  excess  return  is  only  slightly  lower  than  the  mean                                 
excess  return  from  Table  6.2 ;  in  other  words,  most  of  the  mean  excess  return  is  indeed  “skill”                                   
–  it  is  not  just  earned  as  reward  for  bearing  market  risk.   
With  respect  to  the  EUR  strategy,  results  are  a  little  less  informative  since  the  strategy                               
has  a  low  mean  excess  return  to  begin  with.  Adjusting  for  risk  seem  to  lower  the  mean  excess                                     
return  slightly,  but  the  intercept  is  not  statistically  significant,  neither  over  the  full  sample  nor                               
over  any  of  the  two  subsamples.  Over  the  full  sample,  none  of  the  t -statistics  are  significant  at                                   
the  5%  level,  and  the  R²  is  low.  Though  not  significant,  the  mean  excess  return  is  higher  over                                     
the  second  half  of  the  sample  after  adjusting  for  risk,  like  for  the  case  of  USD;  if  that  is  a  true                                           
reflection  of  reality  it  means  that  the  strategy  will  earn  a  negative  risk  premium,  which  means                                 
that  negative  excess  returns  can  lead  to  a  positive  alpha.   
With  the  results  from  Table  6.3 ,  we  can  conclude  that  yield  curve  arbitrage  has  a  fairly                                 
low  level  of  exposure  to  risk  factors,  though  some  long-term  interest  rate  risk  seem  to  remain                                 
as  a  result  of  less-than-perfect  hedge  ratios.  In  our  view,  however,  the  strategy  has  significant                               
model  risk ;  the  strategy  is  largely  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  curvature  and  shape  of  the                                   
swap  curve  will  be  similar  in  the  future  as  in  the  past.  When  this  is  not  the  case,  like  for  EUR                                           
in  the  second  half  of  the  sample,  the  model  breaks  down  and  offers  misleading  predictions  on                                 
the  cheapness/richness  of  certain  swap  rates.  Thus  the  positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  of                           
the  USD  strategy  may  simply  be  a  reward  for  bearing  model  risk.  In  DLY,  they  argue  that  the                                     
positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  return  is  a  result  of  the  intellectual  capital  needed  to  operate  the                               
strategy;  be  that  as  it  may,  but  the  excess  return  could  also  be  a  reward  for  relying  on  a  model                                         
that  may  not  perform  as  well  in  the  future  as  in  the  past.   
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7  Conclusion   
In  this  thesis,  we  examine  the  risk-  and  return-characteristics  of  yield  curve  arbitrage.                           
Following  the  approach  of  Duarte,  Longstaff  and  Yu  (2007),  we  construct  hypothetical  return                           
indexes  for  the  2006-2020  period  by  implementing  the  strategy  on  historical  data  of  USD  and                               
EUR  par  swap  rates.  Our  implementation  relies  on  an  affine  three-factor  term  structure  model                             
to  both  identify  and  hedge  cheap  and  rich  maturities  along  the  yield  curve.  Model  parameters                               
are  estimated  through  a  numerical  optimization  routine,  like  in  Duarte  et  al.  The  strategies  are                               
implemented  on  daily  data,  and  every  practical  detail  of  the  USD  and  EUR  swap  markets  are                                 
taken  into  account  in  order  to  produce  the  most  realistic  return  series.   
Over  the  2006-2020  sample,  with  the  initial  amount  of  capital  set  so  that  the  strategies                               
produce  a  return  volatility  of  12%  per  year,  the  USD  strategy  produces  an  excess  return  of  ca.                                   
5.5%  per  year,  implying  a  Sharpe  ratio  of  0.462.  The  excess  return  of  the  EUR  strategy  is  not                                     
statistically  different  from  zero,  which  we  argue  is  a  result  of  the  three-factor  model  not  being                                 
well  suited  to  describe  the  peculiar  shape  of  the  EUR  swap  curve  that  manifests  over  much  of                                   
the  sample  period.  For  both  USD  and  EUR,  performance  is  markedly  better  over  the  first  half                                 
of  the  sample  (2006-2012)  than  over  the  later  half  (2013-2020),  which  coincides  with  a  fall  in                                 
par  rates  volatility.  This  suggests  that  the  returns  to  the  strategy  are  positively  correlated  with                               
the  level  of  interest  rate  volatility,  which  is  opposite  to  that  of  other  arbitrage  strategies  –  such                                   
as  risk  arbitrage  –  where  heightened  volatility  usually  leads  to  losses.   
Seemingly,  adjusting  for  exposure  to  risk  factors  does  not  materially  lower  the  excess                           
returns  of  the  yield  curve  strategies.  The  USD  strategy  produces  a  risk-adjusted  excess  return                             
of  over  five  percent  per  year,  which  is  significant  at  the  10%  level;  for  EUR,  the  risk-adjusted                                   
excess  return  is  zero.  The  R²  is  roughly  10%  for  EUR  and  roughly  22%  for  USD,  the  latter  of                                       
which  being  higher  due  to  negative  correlation  with  the  stock  market  and  positive  correlation                             
with  Treasury  bonds.  The  positive  correlation  with  Treasury  bonds  illustrates  that  the  hedges                           
are  less  than  perfect  and  that  more  effective  hedges  can  lower  the  R².   
The  findings  in  this  thesis  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  results  of  Duarte  et  al.,  who                                 
report  that  yield  curve  arbitrage  produces  positive,  risk-adjusted  excess  returns  with  a  limited                           
degree  of  exposure  to  risk  factors  (over  the  1988-2004  period,  USD).   
The  question  remains  whether  yield  curve  arbitrage  produces  excess  returns  and,  if  so,                           
whether  that  excess  return  is  “alpha”  or  merely  reward  for  bearing  risk.  Our  results  from  USD                                 
swap  markets  suggest  that  a  well-implemented  strategy  has  the  potential  to  generate  positive,                           
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risk-adjusted  excess  returns  with  a  limited  degree  of  exposure  to  risk  factors.  On  the  contrary,                               
our  results  from  EUR  swap  markets  illustrate  that  the  strategy  is  exposed  to  model  risk  and  to                                   
the  risk  of  structural  changes  in  the  shape  and  volatility  of  the  term  structure.  That  being  said,                                   
the  model  risk  is  likely  overstated  in  our  purely  quantitative  implementation;  in  reality,  some-                             
one  pursuing  the  strategy  would  have  more  flexibility  in  terms  of  both  revising  the  model  and                                 
tuning  the  model’s  parameters  if  performance  starts  to  deteriorate.  We  therefore  conclude  that                           
there  is  potential  for  risk-adjusted  excess  returns,  but  that  this  potential  can  only  be  unlocked                               
through  astute  modeling  and  deep  knowledge  of  market  dynamics.  This  conclusion  is  broadly                           
similar  to  the  one  in  Duarte  et  al.,  where  they  propose  that  the  returns  to  yield  curve  arbitrage                                     
are  a  result  of  the  strategy  requiring  intellectual  capital  to  implement.   
With  respect  to  future  profitability,  we  believe  the  main  risk  of  the  strategy,  especially                             
following  the  monetary  policy  response  to  the  COVID-19  recession,  is  increased  central  bank                           
influence  over  the  yield  curve,  which  may  create  difficult-to-model  term  structure  shapes  and                           
dampen  term  structure  volatility.  This  is  clearly  visible  from  the  second  half  of  the  sample,  in                                 
which  increased  central  bank  influence  and  lower  interest  rate  volatility  –  particularly  in  EUR                             
markets  –  coincides  with  a  marked  stagnation  in  strategy  profitability.   
Finally,  we  would  like  to  encourage  further  research  in  what  we  regard  as  a  somewhat                               
under-researched,  yet  still  very  interesting,  area  of  finance.  It  would  be  interesting  to  see  how                               
other  implementations  of  yield  curve  arbitrage  –  perhaps  using  a  different  model  or  parameter                             
estimation  procedures  –  perform,  and  whether  risk-  and  return-characteristics  are  different  in                         
less  liquid  markets,  such  as  NOK  and  SEK.  Outside  this  particular  realm,  we  also  believe  the                                 
finance  literature  would  benefit  from  further  research  on  the  risk-  and  return-characteristics  of                           
other  popular  fixed  income  arbitrage  trades.  This  will  allow  investors  to  make  more  informed                            
judgements  about  whether  or  not  to  allocate  capital  to  such  strategies.      
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8  Appendix   
8.1  Closed-Form  Solutions  for  Spot  Rates   




















8.2  Discount  Curve  Construction   
With  1-,  2-,  3-,  4-,  5-,  6-,  7-,  8-,  9-,  10-,  12-,  15-,  20-,  and  30-year  par  swap  rates,  we  first  use                                             
a  custom  cubic  spline  to  interpolate  par  swap  rates  at  semiannual  intervals  (USD)  or  at  annual                                 
intervals  (EUR).  The  starting  value  of  the  custom  cubic  spline  is  constrained  to  fit  the  current                                 




where    is  15,    is  in  {0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  10,  12,  15,  20},    is  30,  and   
  




where   is  the  swap  rate  for  year  .  We  lastly  specify  that   and  .                              
  
With  semiannual  or  annual  par  swap  rates  out  to  30  years,  bootstrapping  is  used  to  extract  the                                   
implied  discount  factors.  Then,  discount  factors  for  arbitrary  dates  in  the  future  are  found  via                               




where   is  the  instantaneous  forward  rate  from  term   to  term  ,  and   is  the                                   
implied  discount  factor  to  term  .  To  obtain  for  the  discount  factor  for  an  arbitrary  date  in  the                                     




We  are  aware  that  many  market  participants  have  transitioned  away  from  LIBOR  discounting                           
towards  OIS  discounting  following  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009.  An  OIS  curve,  however,                           
is  constructed  from  par  swap  rates  and  basis  swap  spreads;  since  we  do  not  have  high-quality                                 
data  on  Fed  Funds  vs  3-month  LIBOR  or  EONIA  vs  6-month  EURIBOR  basis  swap  spreads,                               
we  stick  with  the  traditional  methodology  (which  is  still  very  popular).   
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8.3  Figures   
These  figures  show  the  deviation  between  the  swap  rates  implied  by  the  three-factor  model  and  the  market  rates.   
  
Figure  8.01   
  




































































































Figure  8.22   
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